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VOLKER BRINGEZU

Parent-Subsidary Relations
under German Law
Conflict Rules Governing Parent-Subsidiary
Relations Under German Law
1. Introduction:Parent-SubsidiaryRelations
as a Problem of Company Law
I. THE PROBLEM
Traditionally a business corporation is viewed as an independent legal
entity, the main purpose of which is the common economic interest of its
shareholders. The underlying concept of practically all corporate statutes is
that the shareholders have identical interests. So the statutes extensively
regulate the allocation of power between the shareholder-owners and management of a single business corporation. The regulation of the internal
structure of a corporation makes it clear, that the decision-making process
is regarded as a problem related only to one special business enterprise.
This concept of an independent legal unit does not take into account the
possible dangers for the corporation itself, its minority shareholders, and its
creditors which may arise when the corporation becomes subject to the
influence of another business enterprise. A majority shareholder doing
business in the same or a related field as the corporation may not be willing
to restrict his role merely to supply the required capital. He is likely to
exercise his influence in a way which is most profitable to his over-all
business activities.
So a common interest of the shareholders can no longer be taken for
granted. Contrary to its legal independence in form, the corporation is
dependent on decisions which are not made by the corporate organisms,
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and not necessarily in the corporate interest. For the majority shareholder
can use his influence so that the business of the dependent corporation
provides little profit for the corporation itself, as long as his other business
units are profiting.
The sale of corporate products without fair consideration, or the limitation on special products to avoid competition are only two examples of
possible disadvantages.' The detrimental effects on the minority shareholders' investment are self-evident. Similarly the position of the creditors
is endangered when the corporation is no longer managed for the corporate
benefit.
On the other hand, there are strong economic arguments in favor of a
business organization which offers the possibility of subjecting a corporation to the interest of another enterprise. The combination of various
enterprises may lead to a suppression of competition under the unified
control of firms which form a "horizontal" combination, that is a combination of firms engaged in the same line of manufacture at the same stage
of production. Or so-called "vertical" combinations may be formed of a
number of firms engaged in the production of a commodity at various
stages of manufacture, including e.g. sources of supply, production means,
2
and trade organizations.
It is clear that intelligent control has tremendous advantages over blind
struggle. A highly influential school of thought in the Germany of the
twenties argued that the economic value of an "enterprise as such" should
prevail over the interests of unscrupulous, speculating investors. 3 Although
this theory is criticized today, 4 it shows which interests have to be balanced out: The power of a majority shareholder who wants to increase the
effective management of an expanded business enterprise, may be opposed
by the outside or minority shareholders.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT IN GERMANY
The economic development in Germany proved that the conflicts of
interests do not only exist in theory. Combinations of legally independent
enterprises in modern industry were already known before 1914. A first
climax of the growing concentration of business enterprises was reached at
the end of the twenties. At that time the legal literature took an increasing
'See
Z1iner, JuS 1968, p. 299.
2

See-Baumbach-Hueck, § 291 at 861, and Ziner JuS 1968, p. 302.
See survey in Mestmaiicker, Konzerngewalt, at pp. 13 if., and his analysis of decisions of
Reichsgericht which were in favor of this doctrine at pp. 139 ff.
the German
4
See Mestmiicker, on cit. supra, at p. 13, and Resch pp. 141 ff.
5
See Rasch, p. 19.
3

International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

140

interest in the structural problems of corporations as a result of the economic development
But neither the amendments of the corporate law in 1931, nor those of
1937, introduced rules of greater importance on the respective rights of
shareholders and management of corporations which are related to other
business enterprises. 7 Since the data on the concentration in the business
field were known this attitude of the German legislatures can only be
8
interpreted as tolerating this development.
Government investigations in the period between 1954 and 1960
showed that the concentration in the West German economy was continuously increasing.9 When the German Corporate Code (Aktiengesetz) was
extensively amended in 1965, the legislature attempted to face "the reality
of the dialectic contradiction between the legal separateness and factual
interdependence of affiliated or 'related companies.' "10 By that time, approximately seventy per cent of the companies were related to other
business enterprises. 1 For the first time the legislature recognized that this
development required far-reaching innovations in corporate legislation. The
result is a comprehensive set of rules governing "related enterprises," the
"Konzernrecht."12
3. THE SCOPE OF THE NEW GERMAN
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RULES
A. The problem of protecting the individual enterprise which is interrelated to another business enterprise exists, regardless of the form in
which the enterprises are legally organized. A partnership, a close corporation or a publicly held corporation may exercise influence on all sorts of
business organizations. So it was proposed to develop a unitary concept of
"enterprise law" providing a frameworK for an overall company law reform and including the law of "related enterprises.' 3 But these proposals
were regarded as too far-reaching.
Instead, the new rules governing "related enterprises" were introduced
as part of the reform of the German Corporation Code (Aktiengesetz).
6

See Rasch, p. 29, and Stein p. 93.
The fragmentary provisions of the 1937 law contained a definition of a combination
("Konzern"), and some other regulations of minor iniportance, but did not regulate the conflict
of the interests among majority-, minority-shareholders and creditors. See Kellman, BB 1969,
p. 1510, Lehmann-Dietz, p. 486, Rasch, p. 19.
"See Kellman, BB 1969, p. 1510.
9
See Bericht 1964, p. 13: and Rasch, p. 21.
"'Thus Stein, p. 105,
"See Gessler, BB 1965, p. 681, and Wtirdinger, p. 254.
12"Konzern" means in German a combination of enterprises, not a single firm.
3
" See Kropff BB 1965 p. 1281, and Stein p. 10 1.
7
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Consequently these rules apply only if one of the enterprises is an "Aktiengesellschaft" (stock corporation) or a "Kommanditgesellschaft auf Ak14
tien" (association limited by shares).
The "Aktiengesellschaft" is one of the two important kinds of business
organizations which are recognized under German law. This type is the
German equivalent of the American publicly owned business corporation.
The "Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung" (GmbH-company with
limited liability) is comparable to the American close corporation. 15 As the
"Aktiengesellschaft" is practically the most important form of business
organization 16 the new rules on parent-subsidiary relations are of great
importance. Besides these rules have become the model for similar provi17
sions of the GmbH statute which is being reformed.
B. The new law did not undertake to put a brake on the trend toward
further concentration. The explanatory statement accompanying the Government draft bill expressly states, that the regulation of concentration is
not a problem to be dealt with in the Corporation Code.' 8 This task is left
to the Law Against Restraints of Competition which contains limited
provisions on concentration. 19
C. The new law on parent-subsidiary relations is based on a relatively
simple concept: it distinguishes between those relations which are based on
the formation of a "contract of domination" and those which exist as a
matter of fact as one business enterprise is controlling another enterprise.
The new law grants a parent substantial power to direct the subsidiary for
the economic benefit of the whole combination. The price for the legal
recognition of the shift of control from the organs of the subsidiary to the
parent, is compliance with the rules which safeguard the interests of the
subsidiary corporation, its outside or minority shareholders and its creditors.
On the other hand the law still permits establishment of parent-subsidiary relations without a contract of domination being formed.
Originally it was proposed to prohibit a parent from exercising any
influence on the management of a subsidiary.2 0 But finally a more pragmatic solution was adopted in order to deter parents from abusing their power
14

See §§ 291, 292, 311 ff. of the Aktiengesetz 1965. An English translation of the statute
is available (Mueller-Galbraith). Sections hereinafter referred to are those of the Aktiengesetz.
15See Steefel/v. Falkenhausen, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 518 (1967).
16
See Rasch, p. 42.
"See Lehmann-Dietz, p. 487.
18
See Kropff, Bergriindung, p. 374.
19
See Haskell, THE BuSINEss LAWYER, 424 (1969); Stein, p. 104.
20
See Kropff, Begriindung p. 375.
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of control by virtue of the ownership of a majority interest in the subsidiary.
To make sure that the parent is not exploiting the subsidiary the law
imposes on the subsidiary the duty to prepare a comprehensive report of its
business dealings with the parent, or any other related business unit. This
requirement proved to be highly effective and caused most parents to form
a contract of domination thus submitting themselves to the rules protecting
the interests of the other groups involved.
1I.

The New German Law Governing Parent-SubsidiaryRelations

I. DIFFERENTIATION OF ENTERPRISE RELATIONS
The new law recognizes different types of relations which may exist
between legally independent enterprises. 21 The definitions of these various
forms reflect varying degrees of influence or control by one business
enterprise over another. The legal protection of the interests involved
varies according to these differentiations.
Section 16 defines enterprises which are related by virtue of ownership
of a majority interest in one such enterprise by another enterprise. Section
17 deals with dependent and dominating enterprises, the legal qualification
being based merely on the possibility of one enterprise to exercise a
dominating influence on the other one. There is a legal presumption that an
enterprise holding a majority interest is dominating the other enterprise.
It is doubted whether any value is to be found in the distinction between
a majority holder who is "able to exercise dominating influence" (Section
17) and a holder of a majority interest (Section 16).22 In fact the Government had proposed to define an enterprise holding a majority interest as a
dominating enterprise. But the legislature decided that such enterprises
should not be subjected to the strict rules governing parent-subsidiary
relations, if they prove that they do not exercise their influence. 23 This was
the reason for inserting Section 16.
Section 18 (1) defines the socalled subordination combine (Unterordnungskonzern) as follows:
If a dominating and one or more dependent enterprises are joined by the
uniform direction of the dominating enterprise then they constitute a combine ...
21

The statute does not define the term "enterprise" which has to be interpreted by the
courts now. For further aspects, see Kropff, BB 1965, p. 1285.
22
See Kropff, BB 1965 p. 1284.
23
See Kropff, BergrUndung, p. 28, and BB, 1965, p. 1283.

Parent-SubsidiaryRelations under German Law

The coordination combine, on the other side, is formed by enterprises
without one enterprise being dependent on the other.
Finally, the law provides special regulations for mutual or reciprocal
ownership, by which each of two or more business corporations hold an
interest in the other of twenty-five per cent or more. But the rules concerning this form of connection apply only to enterprises with a domestic
domicile and are of no interest if a parent or a subsidiary is a foreign
corporation.
2. "RELATED ENTERPRISES"

All above mentioned forms of connections are called "related enterprises" in the terminology of the Corporate Code, Section 15. In addition
parties to enterprise contracts (Sections 291, 292) are defined as "related
enterprises."
The law governing the various forms of interlocked enterprises is contained in a considerable number of single provisions, which apply to related
enterprises as defined in Section 15, or to relations as defined in Sections
16- 18. These provisions are commonly referred to as the law governing
related enterprises in a broader sense, as opposed to the rules of Book
Three of the new Corporate Code which is expressly entitled 'Related
Enterprises'. 24 Although the provisions of the third Book constitute the
most important part of the law on parent-subsidiary relations, short reference must be made to the major duties which are contained in other
provisions.
In the first place there are a considerable number of reporting requirements which are to provide the investors, and creditors with information
about the holdings, acquisitions, and corporate interrelations. So any business enterprise owning more than twenty-five or fifty per cent of the shares
of a stock corporation with a domestic domicile must notify the latter
which has to publish the notification, Section 20 (1) and (4). Failure to
comply with this requirement causes suspension of the shareholder's rights
in the corporation.
Additional duties to inform exist for related enterprises within Section
15, e.g.: Under Section 90 (i) the executive board 25 has to report to the
supervisory council on business events of substantial importance concerning related enterprises, or the supervisory council 26 may request such a
24

See, e.g., Baumbach-Hueck, p. 853; Z6i1ner, JuS 1968, p. 303.

2For a comparison between the American board of directors, and the organs of a
German
stock company, see Steefel/v. Falkenhausen, 52CORNELL L.Q. 518 (1967).
26
1d.
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report, Section 90 (3); similarly every shareholder must at his request be
given information in the shareholder's meeting regarding the legal and
business relations of a corporation with a related enterprise, Section 131
(1), if this does no considerable damage to the enterprises involved, Section
131 (3).
Every report of the management must include statements on these relations too, Section 160 (3) (nos. 8-10). Accounts receivable from related
enterprises are to be shown separately in the annual balance sheet, Section
151 (1) (111 no. 10), as well as liabilities toward related enterprises. These
provisions were introduced because one objective of the new law is to
7
provide a clearer picture of the corporate interrelationship.
A second kind of duties is purported to balance out the dangers for the
capital of the related enterprises and the creditors. So a dependent enterprise may not subscribe to shares of the dominating enterprise, nor an
enterprise held by a majority to shares of the corporation holding the
majority, Section 56 (2). Other restrictions concern the acquisition of
shares by dependent enterprises, Section 7 1.
A third group of provisions protects the independence of the decision-making process of a dependent corporation. Thus the granting of
credits by dominating or dependent corporations to the legal representatives of related enterprises is subject to special conditions, Section 89 (2),
(cf. Section 115 (1) for members of the supervisory council). On the other
side, the law protects the dominating corporation, too, as the voting rights
may not be exercised for shares which belong to a dependent enterprise,
Section 136 (2). Otherwise the management of the dominating corporation
could influence its own shareholder-meeting resolutions.
3. POWER OF CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

UNDER A CONTRACT OF DOMINATION
Book Three of the Act of 1965 is the sedes materiae of the basic rules
governing parent-subsidiary relations. Sections 29 1, 292 describe six
different kinds of contractual arrangements which typically change the
internal structure of the enterprises involved. 2 All of them are so-called
"Enterprise Contracts" (Unternehmensvertrige). The most important
agreements are defined in Section 29 1 (I) as
Contracts by which a stock corporation ... subjects the direction of its corporation to another enterprise (contract of domination), or by which it obligates itself to transfer all its profits to another enterprise (contract to transfer
profits).
27

See Kropff, BB 1965, p. 1285; Stein, p. 105.
See Kropff, Bergrundung, p. 376.

28
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The contract of domination is the typical agreement by which parent-subsidiary relations are made subject to statutory recognition and regulations which change the "personal law" of a corporation, especially the
relations between the subsidiary and its shareholders. Normally the contract of domination is combined with a contract to transfer profits. 9 The
adjustment of the conflicting interests is sought by balancing out the power
to direct of the dominating enterprise and the protection of the dependent
corporation, of creditors and outside shareholders.
A. Under a contract of domination Section 308 (1) grants the dominating enterprise the right to give directives to the executive board of the
subsidiary corporation. The directives may be disadvantageous to the subsidiary if they serve the interests of the dominating enterprise, or of the
enterprises related to it and the subsidiary corporation in a combine. It is
important to note that the basic change in the law is the now legally
recognized shift of the decision-making power to the dominating enterprise,
and the recognition of the interests of parent-subsidiary relations to the
extent that decisions disadvantageous to the subsidiary are justified, as long
as they prove to be to the economic advantage of the combine. 30
It follows that the pursuit of non-economic interests and that of interests
of third parties including, e.g. single shareholders) is regarded as being
outside of the scope of this privilege l This limitation of the power of the
dominating enterprise cannot be contracted away, insofar as the law is
mandatory. But the parties are not prevented from including further limitations which may be necessary from a practical point of view, in order to get
the necessary consent of outside shareholders (those not connected with
2
the controlling group).
The purpose of this rule is further stressed by an express provision that
the executive board of the subsidiary is obliged to follow the directives of
the dominating enterprise, except when they obviously do not serve the
statutory interests, Section 308 (2).
B. Protection of the Subsidiary and Its Creditors. Contracts of domination as well as contracts to transfer profits do not only endanger the outside

29
The "other enterprise contracts" defined in § 292 do not change the functions of the
organs of a dependent corporation, and are beyond the scope of this paper. For a short survey
see Haskell, THE BUSINEss LAW., 425 (1969) Wirdinger, pp. 302-308, and Zi11ner.luS 1968,
pp. 301-302.
3
OSee Godin-Wilhelmi, p. 1618 Mestmaicker, Festgabeftir Kronstein, p. 135, emphasis
2ed. that the dominating enterprise has the power to influence the subsidiary in a way which
makes other persons liable under § 117.
31
See Rehbinder, AWD 1969, p. 349: Kropff, Begriindung, p. 403.
32
See Kropff, BegrUndung, p. 403; Godin-Wilhelmi p. 1618 f.
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shareholders' interest. They represent a considerable risk for the corporation itself and its creditors. For normally a subsidiary will hardly accumulate earnings or capital reserves. Therefore Section 300 of the new
law provides that a subsidiary must maintain certain minimum capital
reserves. In addition, the law defines the maximum amount of profits which
may be transferred, Section 301.
Most important is the protection effected by Section 302: the dominating
enterprise has to assume the losses which the subsidiary sustains so long as
the contract of domination and/or the contract to transfer profits remains in
effect. If such a contract terminates, the parent enterprise has to render
security to the creditors of the subsidiary corporation, or, alternatively, to
guarantee the claims, Section 303. Thus the power to direct the subsidiary
is accompanied by the financial responsibility of the parent enterprise
toward the creditors.
C. Protection of Outside Shareholders
(a) The provisions dealing with the conclusion, amendments and termination of enterprise contracts, provide for the protection of
outside shareholders. The text of any such contract must be made
available to any shareholder of any corporation which may be a
party to the contract prior to the shareholders' meeting. In addition, the substantial information of the shareholders is required,
Section 293(3) and (4). The contract becomes effective only with
the consent of the shareholders' meeting (at least three fourths of
the share capital represented at the meeting, Section 293( 1).
While the effectivity of the American proxy rules is sometimes
doubted as they vest substantial power in the corporate management, one has to take into account that in Germany most of the
shareholders leave their representation to the banks with which
their shares are deposited. 33 So the banks which propose a vote
may exercise additional control. A recent case proved that a group
of more than twenty-five per cent of shareholders represented by a
bank had sufficient bargaining power to insist on much more
4
favorable conditions for outside shareholders
(b) But outside shareholders who do not own twenty-five per cent of
the share capital do not lack all protection. For they must be given
either a right to reasonable compensation or an option to withdraw
upon appropriate indemnity, Sections 304 - 307.
33

See Steefel/v. Falkenhausen, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 542 (1967).
a4See Beuthien, JuS 1970, p. 58, who gives a detailed survey on the merger of the NSU
AG. into a subsidiary of VW AG.
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The reasonable compensation consists of a guaranteed annual
dividend in the amount of at least the average dividend, which
normally could be distributed to a share. A contract without such
a provision is void, Section 304.
Furthermore the dominating enterprise is obliged to offer an
indemnity to those outside shareholders who want to dispose of
their shares. In general the shareholder may elect to be paid the
fair value of his holdings, in capital stock of the parent corporation
if it is a corporation with domestic domicile, or in cash.
The amount of both the compensation and the indemnity can be
determined by the court if they are not reasonable in the outside
shareholders' opinion.
(c) Once a contract of domination has become effective, the dominating enterprise obtains a comprehensive right to direct the subsidiary corporation.35 But this power is accompanied by certain
liabilities of the parent and its legal representatives.
First of all the legal representatives of the parent are to employ
the diligence of an orderly and conscientious manager in giving
directives to the subsidiary corporation, Section 309. If they violate this duty then they are jointly and severally liable to the
corporation. As it is unlikely that the executive board of a subsidiary will sue the representatives of the parent any damage claim
may also be asserted by every shareholder and under special
conditions by creditors. It is interesting to note that the law treats
the outside shareholders in this context as a group with special
rights. For the corporation may only waive or settle the damage
claims if the outside shareholders consent by special resolution.
Any such waiver or settlement can be vetoed by a minority representing at least ten per cent of the share capital, Section 309(3).
The new statute does not provide a liability of the dominating
enterprise except in the case of a single trader. 36 But the explanatory statement accompanying the Government draft bill, suggests that the parent itself is liable under general principles if its
representatives violate their statutory duties.3 7 This opinion has
since been adopted by a considerable number of legal writers, 38 a
35
See
36
3

supra,p. 12.
See Beuthien, JuS 1970, p. 55.

7See Kropff, Begriindung, p. 404 f.

38

See Godin-Wilhelmi, at 1621; Beuthien, JuS 1970, p. 55; Mestmacker, Festgabe
Kronstein, p. 1335 f.; WUrdinger, p. 291; although it is still unclear which general principle
exactly will apply, as Beuthien and Mestmacker point out.
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fact which is certain to be taken into account if German courts
will have to decide this question.
Finally the members of the executive board of the subsidiary
corporation are jointly and severally liable if they have acted in
violation of their duties. But often the executive board of the
subsidiary will not have the necessary information to determine
whether their acts are really advantageous for the combine as a
whole. So their liability is excluded if the damaging action rests
upon a directive of the parent which they had to follow pursuant
to Section 30842).
4. RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE ABSENCE
OF A CONTRACT OF DOMINATION
If no contract of domination is concluded the question arises as to which
way the different interest groups can be protected against the influence of a
controlling parent. Moreover all provisions based on a contract of domination, may be proved obsolete if as a practical matter a parent could
exercise its influence without submitting itself to the statutory restrictions
which are characteristic for parent-subsidiary relations under a contract of
domination. Quite a number of proposals were made to cope with this
problem including the prohibition to exercise any influence and very strict
liability rules.3 9
The final solution of the new law is based on the principle that a
dominating enterprise must not use its controlling interest in (and thus de
facto control over) a corporation to the prejudice of the controlled party,
without affording it specific compensation within the same fiscal year,
Section 311 (I). This principle is opposed to the power to direct a subsidiary under a contract of domination.
Although a similar restriction did not exist under the old law, 40 one
cannot deny that the new law still recognizes the controlling power of a
parent to a large extent: The law impliedly recognizes that a parent enterprise usually influences the management of the subsidiary, and permits
disadvantageous decisions under the condition that compensation be
41
paid .
Several stringent provisions on liability for damages are to make sure
that Section 311 is complied with: The dominating enterprise, its legal
representatives, and the members of the executive board of the subsidiary
are jointly and severally liable if they violate the duties concerning the
39

See Kropff, BegrUndung, p. 375 and BB 1965, p. 1281.
Kellman, BB 1969, p. 1510.
See Wuirdinger, p. 309.

40
See
41
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compensating provisions, Sections 317, 318. But it is doubtful whether
these provisions offer sufficient protection of the interests of the subsidiary,
creditors, and outside shareholders. Shareholders and creditors can hardly
prove that the compensation provisions were violated 42 as they are not
informed about the conditions of transactions between the enterprises.
The lawmaker tried to take these difficulties into account. 43 As a result,
the subsidiary is required to report annually all transactions induced by, or
serving the interest of, the controlling enterprise, Sections 3 12 ff. The
report must also include all transactions taken with other related enterprises of the parent. As to compensation, the report has to state in detail
how the compensation did in fact take place.
This report has to be submitted to independent auditors and to the
supervisory board, Sections 313, 314. This means of supervision is much
more important in practice than the potential liabilities, to deter parents
from avoiding the conclusion of a contract of domination. In fact, in quite a
number of cases it was frankly admitted that the only reason for forming a
contract of domination had been to avoid the duty to report under Section
312.44
Ill. TransnationalParent-SubsidiaryRelations
If a combine is formed by a German and a foreign enterprise, the
question arises to the extent to which these relations are subject to the new
German law on related enterprises, or whether these relations are governed
by a different national legal system. Some of these questions are expressly
solved in the Corporate Code: e.g., integration of a corporation is only
possible into another corporation with domestic domicile, Section 3 19.
Consequently this form of enterprise relations is not available for the
45
organization of multi-national enterprises.
Another example is to be found in Section 330(2), which contains a
special provision on the preparation of consolidated financial statements, if
the combine direction has its domicile abroad. These provisions show that
not all questions concerning the reach of the new Corporate Code were left
to the conflict of laws. Therefore one must examine which provisions of the
parent-subsidiary rules determine the application in situations in which a
foreign enterprise is involved, and the relation of these provisions to the
principles of the conflict-of-laws rules has to be clarified.
42

See Rasch, p. 168.
4aSee Kropff, BegrUndung, p. 411.
44See the examples given by Meilicke, p. 119.
45See Koppensteiner, p. 219; WUrdinger, pp. 221 and 279.
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1.NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL REACH OF
THE PARENT-SU BSIDIARY RULES

A. Related Enterprises. With regard to the duties imposed by the law

on related enterprises in a broader meaning of the word46 the substantive
law regulates the application as follows.
The reporting requirements in Section 20(1) and (4) do not distinguish
between foreign and domestic enterprises, holding an interest of more than
twenty-five or fifty per cent of the shares of a stock corporation with
domestic domicile. This indicates that foreign business enterprises are
subject to the reporting requirements. As the interest of information of
creditors and investors is the same, regardless which enterprise is involved,
it is generally held that foreign enterprises also must give the required
7
information
The other provisions requiring the executive board to inform the supervisory council or shareholders, 48 are part of the rights and duties of the
constitutional organs of a German corporation. The duty to inform iricludes
the relation of the corporation to foreign enterprises. But as this duty is
only imposed on the organs of a German corporation, it is equally clear
that these provisions do not regulate the respective rights and duties of
foreign enterprises. Similarly the provisions on the data to be included in
the reports of the management and the annual balance sheet 49 apply only to
the German corporation, not to the foreign enterprise to which the German
corporation is related.
The limitations on subscription to, and acquisition of, shares by a dependent enterprise-Sections 56(2) and 74(4)-intended as a guarantee that a
corporation will not circumvent the prohibition to acquire its own shares.
So the purpose of this prohibition is the protection of the capital assets of
the German parent corporation. Therefore, this provision is interpreted to

apply only when a foreign enterprise is dependent, and a German corporation is dominating. It is not the objective of these provisions to protect
foreign parent corporations. 50 Thus a German subsidiary corporation may
acquire shares of its foreign parent.
The third group of provisions protecting the decision-making process in

corporations is construed in the same way: the suspension of the voting
rights of dependent enterprises by Section 136(2), purports to regulate only
46

See supra, p. 8.

47

See Godin-Wilhelmi, p. 95: Koppensteiner, p. 285; Wirdinger, p. 264; Baumbach-Hueck,
p. 54; Bernhardt, BB 1966, p. 679.
48
See supra, p. 9.

49
See
50

Koppensteiner, p. 294.
See Wiurdinger, p. 21: Grasmann, p. 455; Koppensteiner, p. 28.
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the decision-making of a domestic corporation, without giving the management the possibility of influencing the shareholders' resolutions. 51 As far as
the granting of credits to the legal representatives of a dependent enterprise
is concerned, the restrictions of Sections 89(2) and i 15(1) apply whether it
2
is dominated by a domestic or a foreign corproation
B. Power of Control and Responsibilities

(a) The central question concerning parent-subsidiary rules is of
course whether a foreign corporation can be a party to a contract
of domination. The language of Section 29 1 "by which a stock
corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) or a corporation limited by shares
(Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien) subjects the direction of this
corporation to another enterprise.

.

." is not as clear as the lan-

guage of comparable provisions. But there are a number of reasons why most legal writers think that a German corporation can
53
subject its direction to a foreign enterprise.
First of all, one can conclude from the regulations of two other
provisions that the legislature has recognized the problems which
arise as a consequence of the growing international concentration.
Section 3 19 expressly forbids integration into a foreign corporation. As Section 291 does not contain a similar prohibition, one
may argue e contrario that the law permits the conclusion of a
contract of domination which subjects a German corporation to
4
the directive of a foreign enterprise
Furthermore Section 305(2)(no. I) provides a special rule for
the indemnity which has to be offered to outside shareholders: if
the dominating corporation is not a corporation with a domestic
domicile then the indemnity has to be in cash instead of shares of
the dominating corporation.
In addition Koppensteiner points out that the underlying policy
of the new provisions as to the contract of domination, as well as
on the responsibilities in the absence of a contract of domination,
is to make dominating enterprises enter into the formal agreement. 55 The legislative history56 clearly shows the reluctant attitude of the legislature concerning the exercise of de facto control.
5
'See
52

WUrdinger, p. 21: Koppensteiner, p. 291.
See Koppensteiner, p. 295.
See Barz BB 1966, p. 1168: Godin-Wilhelmi, p. 1513; Mhring-Tank-Grass-Reuss,
no. 736: especially Koppensteiner, p. 245 ff.
comment
54
See Koppensteiner, p. 245.
55
See 2d Koppensteiner, p. 246.
56
See supra, p. 143.
53
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An interpretation neglecting this purpose seems to be inconsistent
with the objectives of the new rule 57 So a contract of domination
between a foreign enterprise and a German corporation is valid
under Section 29 1.
The right to give directives, even disadvantageous to the German subsidiary corporation, exists under Section 308(1) as long as
the directives are of economic benefit to the combine as a unit. An
interesting question arises here due to the fact that parent and
subsidiary are subject to different legal systems, and "citizens" of
countries which may pursue different foreign trade policies: e.g.,
a business transaction may be forbidden to the American parent
under the Trading with the Enemy Act, whereas such a business is
permitted under the law of the subsidiary.
If the American parent directs its subsidiary corporation to do
business only in compliance with the American restrictions, then
this directive is not of any economic advantage to the combine,
unless the American parent would show that it suffers economic
losses otherwise. So directives, the only purpose of which is to
enforce conformity with regulations of the parent's home country,
are generally not regarded as a justification for disadvantageous
decisions within Section 308(1).58
The provisions protecting the interest of the subsidiary corporations, its creditors and the protection of outside shareholders,
form the body of law which governs the relations of parties to a
contract of domination. Section 305(2)-as mentioned abovecontains a special provision that a foreign parent may offer an
indemnity in cash only. As the other provisions do not distinguish
between foreign and domestic dominating enterprises, the rules
apply as outlined above.
(b) The same result is true for the provisions on responsibilities,
which arise when a dominating foreign enterprise exercises its
control power without having concluded a contract of domination. 59 For the purpose of this group of provisions is the protection
of the corporations organized under the German Corporate Code
against the dominating influence of other business enterprises. So
from the teleological point of view it does not make any differ57

See Meilicke, pp. 118- 121.
See Rehbinder, AWD, 1969, p. 348, especially note 24 concerning the Fruehauf case:
Koppensteiner,
p. 319.
59
See WUrdinger, p. 21; Godin-Wilhelmi, p. 86; Koppensteiner, pp. 294, 296.
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ence, whether this influence is exercised by a domestic or foreign
enterprise.
C. German Parent and Foreign Subsidiary. Relations between a German parent corporation and a foreign subsidiary do not present a great
problem under German law. Most of the provisions of Book Three on
related enterprises, deal only with the case in which a German corporation
is subject to the influence of a dominating enterprise. Consequently the law
does not apply when a foreign subsidiary corporation is involved. 0
Whether a German parent corporation has to obtain the consent of its
shareholders' meeting under Section 293(2) when a contract of domination
is concluded with a foreign subsidiary, seems to be a question of little
importance as long as other legal systems have no institutions which could
be compared to the contract of domination. It is suggested that if such a
contract would impose duties on the German parent similar to those in
Sections 300-3 10, then Section 293(2) would apply.
Besides the duties which are part of the law of related business enterprises 6 1 the law contains only some provisions on the preparation of
consolidated financial statements: under Section 329(2) a German parent is
62
free to include statements on a foreign subsidiary corporation.
2. CONFLICT OF LAWS' RULES ON
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONS
There are no statutory provisions containing the law of the
conflict-of-laws rules of corporations. But it is generally recognized that
questions concerning the "international private law" of corporations 63 include the fields of contractual liability, liability in tort and the "personal
law" of corporations. 64 The personal law includes the regulations of all
internal affairs of a corporation, such as the relations between organs and
the corporation, relations between the organs 'inter se' and organs 'inter
se'.65

If business corporations which are subject to different legal systems 66
60

See Koppensteiner, pp. 98, 266-268.
supra, p. 145.
For a further discussion of related questions, see Koppensteiner, pp. 324-28; Wtirdinger,6 3p. 22.
This is the terminology known in most countries; see Steiner/Vagts, p. 79.
64
See Fikentscher, MDR 1957, p. 73.
65See Fikentscher, MDR 1957, p. 73; Raape, p. 201: cf. Rabel, p. 69 ff.: ILA-Report
1962,6 6p. 8 8 .
The problem of determination of a company's personal law is not within the scope of
this paper, as the question discussed presuppose that the enterprises involved are subject to
different legal systems. As to the difficulties which may arise when there are two connecting
factors (incorporation and domicile) see Fikentscher MDR 1957, p. 74.
61
See
62
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become "related enterprises," the question arises as to which law governs
these relations. As far as the substantive law regulates the application of
provisions in these situations, one has to examine whether these rules are
compatible with the recognized principles of the international private law.
A. Related Enterprises. The duty of business enterprises to inform a
German corporation of which they own more than twenty-five per cent or
fifty per cent is part of the regulations which deal with the relation between
a German corporation and its shareholders. 67 That this is the legal concept
is clearly shown by the sanction of suspension of the shareholder's rights.
This duty belongs therefore to the personal law of the German corporation.
The application of this provision on foreign enterprises, which own
shares of a German corporation is a matter which belongs to the personal
law of a domestic corporation under German conflict of laws principles. 68
The information of shareholders and supervisory council by the executive
board, also concerns the internal relations of a German corporation, and to
that extent qualifies as a problem to be dealt with by the personal law.
The prohibitive provisions on subscription to and acquisition of shares
by a dependent enterprise, serve the purpose of protecting the capital of a
domestic parent corporation. The provisions on raising and preserving the
capital of a corporation are generally regarded as being within the scope of
the personal law. 69 As Sections 56(2), 71(4) regulate this matter, their
application on foreign dependent enterprises and non-application to foreign
parent corporations, conform to the conflict of laws rules. Similarly the
provisions which protect the decision-making process in German corporations are within the scope of the personal law of these corporations, since
they govern internal corporate relations.
B. Power of Control and Responsibilities. The main criterion of the
contract of domination-as described-is the shift of control from the
organs of the dependent domestic corporation to the dominating enterprise.
Thus, this contract fundamentally changes the corporate organization as
the dependent corporation surrenders its autonomy. On the other hand, the
very detailed rules protecting the interests of the subsidiary, its creditors
and outside shareholders, balance out the disadvantages of this shift of
control. These rules constitute a uniform system which cannot be broken
up. All the rules on the contract of domination, qualify as the personal law
70
of a German subsidiary corporation.
67

See Bernhardt, BB 1966, p. 679: Kropff, BegrUndung, p. 39.
See Baumbach-Hueck, p. 54: Wiirdinger, pp. 2 I, 264; Bache, p. 110; Koppensteiner, p.

68

285.

6

sSee Koppensteiner, AWD 1970, p. 437, and op. cit. p. 288; Wtirdinger, p. 21" cf. ILA
Report, 1954, pp. 390 f. and Draft Convention on Conflict of Laws Relating to Companies,
ILA 7Report 1960, art. 3, p. 93.
"SeeWirdinger, p. 21: Koppensteiner, p. 310.
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Similarly the rules on parent-subsidiaries provide a system in Sections
3 1I if,
which intended to balance the divergent interests involved. Furthermore, one must take into account the interdependence between the rules
governing a contract of domination, and the provisions on de facto control.
Therefore it is generally held that Sections 3 1I ff are part of the personal
law of a German subsidiary corporation. 71
C. The relations between a German parent corporation and a foreign

subsidiary are not regulated by the rules on related enterprises in Book
Three of the Corporate Code. This concept is convincing, as there is no
need for the German legislature to protect the interest groups of corporations which are not organized under German law.
3. CONCLUSION

The new German Corporate Code contains a number of provisions on
related enterprises which apply to dominating or dependent enterprises.
But as far as the substantive law claims to reach transnational situations
the questions involved concern the relations between organs and a German
corporation, the relations of a German corporation and its members, between the members inter se, and the organs inter se. These matters are
generally regarded as part of the personal law of a corporation.
Similarly the rules governing the power of control and responsibilities
arising in a parent-subsidiary relation, regulate only matters which require
the protection of domestic corporations, and of the groups connected with
it. This concept also conforms to generally recognized conflict of law rules.
These principles are not only part of the German conflict-of-laws rules,
but are recognized in most countries. 72 Therefore, there is a chance that
foreign courts might reach the same decision as to which law is applicable,
if they have to deal with a situation which involves relations between a
foreign business enterprise and a German corporation. From this point of
view the new rules are compatible with one of the principal policies in the
field of choice of law: 73 to seek uniformity of result, whatever the forum in
which an action might be brought.

71See Wirdinger, p. 21; Koppensteiner, p. 294 and AWD, 1970, p. 438 f.;
Rehbinder,
AWD 1969, p. 348.
72See, e.g., Rabel, p. 69; Steiner/Vagts, p. 83ff. Arts. 3 and 4 Draft Convention on
Conflict of Laws Relating to Companies, ILA Report 1962, p. 93.
7aSee Steiner/Vagts, p. 80.
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